Ghost Drivers from Lithuania. Inside the ELD Fraud Machine

How a motor carrier's systematic electronic logging device fraud, managed from overseas, enabled a fatigued driver to kill three people in Virginia

At 1:36 a.m. on December 16, 2022, the digital deception finally caught up with reality on I-64 near Williamsburg, Virginia, about five minutes from where I live. A Triton Logistics truck, traveling 65 mph with cruise control engaged, slammed into a party bus moving just 20 mph. The collision was so violent that it separated the bus's roof and sidewalls from the chassis, ejecting all 23 passengers across multiple lanes of traffic and through a median guardrail.

Three men died. Twenty others were injured and a comprehensive NTSB investigation revealed one of the most sophisticated electronic logging device fraud schemes ever documented, a systematic falsification that turned safety technology into a tool for reg side steps, managed from a Lithuanian office thousands of miles away.

According to truck driver Daniel Cramer's RoadStar ELD, he was operating legally in a team configuration with a codriver. The electronic record showed proper hours of service compliance, with driving time split between two licensed operators. Virginia State Police were initially told that Cramer had just dropped his codriver at a truck stop before the crash.

It was all fabricated.

The alleged codriver had been fired from Triton eight days before the crash. When NTSB investigators tracked him down, he told them he had never met Cramer, had never been in the truck with him, and had never driven long-distance trips for Triton. He was a local driver based at Triton's Virginia location who didn't even routinely use an ELD.

Cramer had been driving for seven consecutive days, accumulating about 75 hours on duty in the week leading up to the crash. He had exceeded federal driving limits multiple times, the 14-hour rule four times, the 11-hour rule three times, and the 70-hour weekly limit by more than four hours but none of this appeared in his official ELD record, thanks to Triton's systematic fraud operation.

The Lithuanian Connection

The key to understanding Triton's fraud lies deep in the NTSB report. The company's Hours of Service department was based in Lithuania, operating thousands of miles from the trucks it was supposedly monitoring.

Here's how the scheme worked, as detailed in federal investigators' interviews with Cramer and four other former Triton drivers:

When drivers reached their 11-hour driving limit, they would call Triton's HOS department in Lithuania by cell phone. Lithuanian personnel would then log the driver out of the ELD system and create a login for a fictitious co-driver, often using variations of the real driver's information or data from former employees. This opened up another 11-hour driving window under the fake identity. The drivers were coached on what to say to roadside inspectors if questioned about their supposed co-driver. The standard story: they had just dropped off their codriver at a truck stop for a family emergency.

The NTSB's technical analysis of Triton's ELD data revealed the sophisticated nature of the fraud. In Cramer's case, the driver and codriver information contained telling similarities:

• Identical driver's license numbers and issuing state (Alabama)

• Nearly identical login credentials: The driver's login was his last name followed by his first name and the number 2; the codriver's login was similar but with "tl" added at the end

• Suspicious timing: The codriver account showed activity during periods when the supposed individual was already terminated from employment

Triton modified the alleged codriver's license information between December 16 and December 19, 2022, changing it from an Alabama license number (matching the real driver) to a Virginia license number before uploading the data to FMCSA's Electronic Record of Duty Status system. This post-crash manipulation suggests the company knew the original data wouldn't withstand scrutiny.

Triton used RoadStar LLC as its ELD provider, a company that was self-certified and listed on FMCSA's approved device list. This issue is directly related to ongoing problems with the ELD approval process, which have resulted in the FMCSA removing multiple providers from the approved list in recent months.

The self-certification system allows ELD manufacturers to attest that their devices meet federal requirements without independent verification. Still, as the Triton case demonstrates, the real problem isn't just device functionality, it's the lack of audit capabilities that would detect systematic fraud.

The current ELD regulations don't require tracking of crucial data entry information:

• Who creates driver logins

• When login information is modified

• Who makes changes to active driver lists

• When false entries are created or altered

Triton's HOS manager told investigators his team was responsible for creating driver ELD logins, but denied creating additional logins for drivers to use, claiming it might have been "a mistake." The company's CEO was unable to explain the discrepancy with the fake codriver login.

Without comprehensive audit logs, these denials are nearly impossible to disprove, even when the evidence of systematic fraud is overwhelming.

The Human Cost

The party bus operated by Futrell’s Party Adventures, LLC was carrying the owner's family and friends back from a social event in Richmond. This group included brothers Jontae Russell and X'zavier Evans, along with Montia Bouie. All three died when the bus disintegrated around them.

Forward-facing Samsara video from Cramer's truck showed him repeatedly drifting onto the shoulder in the three minutes before impact, classic signs of a fatigued driver experiencing microsleeps. Engine control module data confirmed he never touched the brakes as he approached the slower-moving vehicle.

The collision was entirely preventable. A properly rested driver would have had sufficient time to brake or steer around the bus. The speed differential, about 45 mph, gave an alert driver approximately five seconds to respond once the bus became visible as a hazard requiring action. Instead, Cramer was operating in a diminished state of alertness, caused by chronic sleep debt resulting from working excessive hours, which was enabled by his company's fraudulent logging system.

The Bus Company's Contributing Failures

While Triton's ELD fraud was the primary cause of the crash, Futrell's Party Adventures compounded the tragedy through its own regulatory violations and safety management failures.

The bus was improperly registered as a noncommercial passenger vehicle despite being used for commercial passenger service. The 23-year-old driver had a suspended license and lacked both the CDL and passenger endorsement required to operate a vehicle carrying 16 or more passengers.

Maintenance records revealed systematic neglect with the fuel prescreen filter at least 50% blocked with debris, likely contributing to the bus's dangerously slow speed. Investigators found extensive corrosion throughout the vehicle's frame and rotting wood in the floor and roof structure. The perimeter seating wasn't properly anchored and had no seatbelts.

When Virginia granted Futrell's operating authority just 30 days before the crash, the state provided only administrative information, nothing about driver licensing requirements, vehicle maintenance, or safety management practices that might have prevented these failures.

Neither of these commercial vehicles nor the drivers was supposed to be on the road at the time of this crash. What are the odds of two grossly negligent carriers being involved in the same crash? Not good, which means there's far more operators like this out there.

A Slap on the Wrist

FMCSA's enforcement response to this systematic fraud has been woefully inadequate. After conducting a post-crash compliance review, the agency:

• Fined Triton $36,170, roughly the cost of the truck involved in the crash

• Assigned a conditional safety rating that still allows the company to operate

• Took no criminal referral action despite clear evidence of systematic regulatory fraud

The conditional rating did increase Triton's Inspection Selection System score from 61 to 97, making their vehicles more likely to be selected for roadside inspection. Since the crash, 211 roadside inspections have been conducted on Triton vehicles, with three citing false logs as violations.

In those 211 post-compliance review inspections, no codrivers were listed or mentioned in the notes sections. The absence of team drivers in subsequent inspections suggests the company may have temporarily suspended its ghost driver operations while under scrutiny.

The Broader ELD Fraud Epidemic

Three years after RoadStar LLC's ELD system enabled Triton Logistics' systematic ghost driver fraud that killed three people in Virginia, FMCSA finally took action. On January 8, 2025, the agency revoked RoadStar Solutions from its approved ELD list for "failure to meet minimum requirements," specifically, the basic requirement that ELD displays be viewable by safety officials without entering vehicles.

RoadStar appears to operate under multiple business names, with "United ELD" also being removed the same day under the same corporate umbrella of "ROAD STAR Inc." Industry observers note that revoked ELD providers routinely rebrand and continue operations under new identities, exploiting FMCSA's reactive oversight system that relies heavily on manufacturer self-certification. Of the 296 ELDs currently on the agency's revoked list, only 55 were removed by federal action, the remaining 241 were "self-revoked" by manufacturers, suggesting most problematic devices are only pulled when companies voluntarily admit non-compliance. For the families of Jontae Russell, X'zavier Evans, and Montia Bouie, RoadStar's belated revocation represents justice delayed and accountability deferred. This regulatory system acts only after bodies pile up on American highways.

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance officials confirm that ELD fraud isn't limited to Triton, roadside inspectors are encountering similar schemes "every shift, at least once or twice." The methods are evolving constantly:

• Ghost Driver Creation: Companies create fictional codriver accounts to double available driving hours, as Triton did systematically.

• BackOffice Manipulation: Carriers edit ELD records from their offices, making changes that don't appear as edits to roadside inspectors because authorized personnel, rather than drivers make the modifications.

• Third-Party Fraud Services: An underground industry has emerged offering ELD editing services to carriers, with companies openly soliciting motor carriers to modify electronic logs illegally.

• The Lithuanian connection in Triton's case also raises questions about offshore management of safety-critical functions and whether adequate oversight is possible when HOS management is conducted from foreign countries with different legal and regulatory frameworks.

Technology Present But Failed

The Virginia crash showcases a more insidious problem than carriers rejecting safety technology; it reveals the catastrophic failure of tech they had adopted, trusted, and marketed as life-saving. Triton operated Samsara CM31 forward-facing camera systems equipped with AI-powered forward collision warning capabilities that promised "real-time alerts" and detection of imminent collisions. Yet as the fatigued driver approached a slow-moving bus at a 45 mph speed differential, with the bus clearly visible for at least five seconds before impact, the Samsara system provided no collision warning whatsoever.

The failure becomes even more damning when considering what the system did accomplish: Samsara's technology captured three minutes of forward-facing video leading up to the crash, automatically detected the collision event itself, uploaded time-stamped data to the cloud, and provided investigators with complete documentation of the tragedy. The system was clearly functioning, connected, and analyzing the video feed in real-time, it just couldn't predict what any alert driver would have seen coming. The lane departures would have sent an alert with systems like Motive, which has advanced detection for fatigue, including lane deviation.

This is acritical gap between detection capability, AI model capabilities and predictive algorithms. Samsara's technology can document a crash as it happens, but cannot warn that one is about to happen, despite marketing materials explicitly promising forward collision warning functionality. The NTSB noted that the truck driver "recorded no braking action before impact," suggesting he received no audible or visual warning from the system he was depending on to keep him safe.

The Samsara failure in Virginia fits an emerging litigation pattern where the company faces lawsuits for forward collision warning deficiencies, including the settled Pruitt v. Hansen & Adkins case in Alabama and reported failures in other crashes involving carriers who had trusted the technology to prevent exactly these scenarios. When safety technology fails to perform as marketed, it creates a more dangerous situation than having no technology at all. Drivers and carriers develop false confidence in systems that prove ineffective when lives depend on them.

Three young men died not because Triton rejected safety technology, but because the technology they adopted failed at the moment it was needed most. Ironically, the same system was involved in the Ashley Chapman Lucky Dog crash in Gloucester, VA, just five minutes from where the James City Crash occurred. Samsara did not alert the driver to Ashley Chapman's stopped vehicle at a red light, and, asleep, he rear-ended her. In the Lucky Dog case, Samsara’s driver's face cam did not detect that the driver was sleeping. This represents a potential product liability crisis that extends far beyond a single crash, calling into question whether Samsara’s systems are ready for the life-and-death responsibilities they claim to handle. NTSB's own video report called out Samara's issues and discrepancies in their data in the Pruitt case and Samsara never responded to or addressed any of it besides settling the case.

The Regulatory Response

The NTSB issued six new safety recommendations and reiterated three existing ones following its investigation. Key recommendations include:

• Enhanced ELD Requirements: Mandate comprehensive audit logs tracking date, driver login times, who logged drivers in, names of anyone who edited logs, driver's license numbers, and active driver list changes.

• Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Notification: Inform CVSA members about ghost driver schemes and the importance of comparing driver information to ELD logs during enforcement interventions.

• Triton Specific Requirements: Implement processes to verify driver duty status accuracy, establish fatigue management programs, and use onboard video for driver coaching.

These recommendations face the same industry resistance that has stymied previous safety reforms. Motor carriers argue that enhanced audit requirements would be burdensome and expensive, despite clear evidence that current systems enable systematic fraud.

Foreign Management

Triton's use of Lithuanian offshore labor to manage critical safety functions raises questions about the globalization of trucking operations and regulatory oversight capabilities.

When safety-critical decisions are made by personnel in foreign countries, several oversight challenges come into play:

• Jurisdictional limitations for enforcement actions

• Communication barriers that may impede proper safety management

• Cultural differences in safety prioritization and regulatory compliance

• Time zone complications that may delay critical safety interventions

The NTSB report doesn't address whether FMCSA has adequate authority to oversee carriers that outsource safety management functions to foreign countries. Still, the Triton case suggests this regulatory gap needs immediate attention. The Beam Brothers in Mt. Crawford case had a similar hours of service fraud scheme ongoing, and they were all arrested. What happened to accountability here?

The most frustrating aspect of this preventable tragedy is that solutions exist today. Enhanced ELD audit capabilities are technically feasible. While I am not 100% on board with automatic emergency braking, it could have prevented or mitigated the crash. Proper oversight of foreign safety management operations is entirely possible.

What's missing is the political will to impose meaningful consequences on those perpetuating fraud in an industry that has successfully escaped accountability for a decade. At the same time, legitimate fleets and carriers pay the price and cost of negligent carriers, while incurring higher overhead costs to remain safety-focused.

Three young men died because Triton Logistics systematically defrauded federal safety regs with help from Lithuanians managing phantom drivers. The company paid an acceptable amount, equivalent to pocket change, and continues to operate under conditional oversight.

Until the consequences for ELD fraud include criminal prosecution of executives and financial penalties that threaten corporate survival, carriers will continue treating safety regulations as suggestions rather than requirements.

The ghost drivers from Lithuania may have disappeared from Triton's current operations, but the regulatory framework that enabled their existence remains largely unchanged. And that means more families will join the ranks of those devastated by preventable commercial vehicle crashes.

About this investigation: This report is based on NTSB final report HIR2405, FMCSA compliance review documents, court filings, and federal enforcement records. Technical analysis was verified through multiple regulatory databases.