OG Chameleon Carriers Before Chameleon Carriers Were Cool - Sherman and Linhart Investigations

Continuing our 30 Days of Why series, we’re breaking down the foundational cases that exposed what it means to be a chameleon carrier

Two catastrophic crashes in 2008 forever changed how federal regulators track unsafe motor carriers attempting to evade oversight by changing names and operating identities. The Sherman, Texas bus crash and the death of Kelly Linhart became the poster cases for what the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration now calls "chameleon carriers.” Chameleon Carriers are companies that shut down operations only to reopen under new names, while continuing to use the same unsafe drivers, equipment, and practices.

These cases exposed fatal flaws in the regulatory system that allowed dangerous operators to game the system, leading to comprehensive reforms in how the FMCSA vets new carrier applications and tracks potential reincarnations.

The Sherman, Texas Bus Crash

On August 8, 2008, at approximately 12:45 a.m., a 2002 Motor Coach Industries 56-passenger bus carrying 55 Vietnamese Catholic pilgrims crashed near Sherman, Texas, killing 17 people and injuring 38 others. The bus was traveling from Houston to the annual Marian Days Festival in Carthage, Missouri, when its right front tire failed at highway speed.

The retreaded tire on the bus's right steer axle experienced catastrophic failure due to prolonged underinflation caused by an unrepaired puncture. (This is why retread tires on passenger steer axles are actually illegal.) The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the tire operated in an "over-deflected" condition for an estimated 1,000 miles or less before the fatal blowout occurred at approximately 68 mph.

As the motorcoach approached the Post Oak Creek bridge, the tire failure caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The bus departed the roadway at about a 4-degree angle, overrode a concrete curb, struck the metal bridge railing, and ultimately plunged through the railing and off the 8-foot-high bridge, coming to rest on the earthen abutment below.

The Chameleon Connection

The bus was operated by Iguala BusMex Inc., a company that had applied for operating authority on July 27, 2008, but had not yet received approval from the FMCSA. The owner, Angel De La Torre, 59, also owned Angel Tours Inc., which had been placed out of service by federal regulators on June 23, 2008, following an unsatisfactory safety rating.

FMCSA investigators determined that Angel Tours received its unsatisfactory rating after a May 2008 compliance review uncovered critical violations, including the use of drivers who hadn't undergone negative pre-employment drug tests, failure to medically qualify drivers, and failure to require driver vehicle inspection reports. The company had 45 days to submit a corrective action plan but failed to do so on time, resulting in the out-of-service order.

Rather than fix the safety problems, De La Torre applied for new operating authority under the name Iguala BusMex while continuing operations. At the time of the crash, Iguala BusMex had no insurance coverage and no federal operating authority. The FMCSA later determined that Angel Tours and Iguala BusMex used the same equipment, drivers, routes, customer base and operated from the same location while being controlled by the same owner.

The 52-year-old bus driver, Barrett Broussard, had an extensive history of safety violations that should have barred him from operating commercial vehicles. Post-accident toxicology tests revealed benzoylecgonine in his blood, indicating cocaine use. His commercial driving license medical certificate had expired on May 24, 2008, nearly three months before the crash.

The driver's background check revealed a 1995 termination from Greyhound Lines (We talk extensively about GH in Day 5, their issues didn't start today.) for testing positive for cocaine, a 2001 DWI conviction, and multiple speeding violations. He had been placed out of service twice in 2007 for failing to maintain required logbooks and lacking a valid medical certificate.

The crash exposed multiple system failures. The bus had passed a Texas state safety inspection just eight days before the accident at "5 Minute Inspections" in Houston. This facility lacked proper equipment to conduct thorough commercial vehicle inspections. The inspection was later revealed to be inadequate - another Angel Tours bus that had received an "all items passed" inspection at the same facility was placed out of service the next day during a Missouri Highway Patrol inspection, which revealed numerous safety violations.

The NTSB investigation also revealed that the bus was illegally equipped with a retreaded tire on the front axle, which violates federal regulations prohibiting the use of retreaded tires on the steering axles of passenger vehicles.

On August 9, 2008, one day after the crash, the FMCSA issued imminent hazard orders shutting down both Angel Tours and Iguala BusMex. In 2013, federal prosecutors indicted De La Torre and employee Carlos Ortuno on charges of making false statements on federal forms and operating without authority.

In 2015, De La Torre pleaded guilty to operating a commercial motor vehicle after receiving an unsatisfactory rating. He was sentenced to three years of probation, fined $500, and ordered to perform 55 hours of community service. Charges against his companies were dropped because they were no longer in operation.

Victims' families expressed outrage at the lenient sentence. "It's like Mr. de la Torre got less than a slap on the wrist for taking 17 lives," said Yen-Chi Le, whose mother died in the crash. Medical and funeral costs for victims exceeded $3.7 million.

Angel De La Torre completed his probation and remains in the Houston area. Angel Tours and Iguala BusMex are permanently shut down. The Texas Department of Transportation upgraded the bridge railing to current safety standards in 2009 following the crash.

Kelly Linhart Case

Kelly J. Linhart was a 52-year-old professional truck driver from Blodgett, Oregon, and father of four children. A 15-year military veteran who served in both the Marine Corps and U.S. Army, Linhart began his civilian trucking career with Schneider National in 1990, receiving multiple safety awards. At the time of his death, he was a senior driver with Jim Pruitt Trucking.

Sometimes it’s the good truck drivers who pay the price. That's this case. The crazy part is that there is very little data on this case at all.

On September 25, 2008, Linhart had stopped his 2005 Volvo tractor-trailer on the northbound shoulder of Interstate 5 near milepost 4, about four miles north of the Oregon-California border in the Siskiyou Pass, to conduct a routine brake inspection. At approximately 3:40 p.m., a 1996 Freightliner operated by Daniel Clarey, 54, of Long Beach, California, veered out of its lane and struck Linhart's trailer.

The impact threw Linhart under Clarey's truck, dragging him to his death. Oregon State Police found Clarey to be under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of the controlled substance. He was immediately arrested and charged with criminally negligent homicide, driving under the influence, and drug possession.

Daniel Clarey had an extensive criminal history involving methamphetamine and marijuana that should have prevented his employment as a commercial driver. In depositions, Clarey admitted to being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the crash and acknowledged his previous drug-related criminal record.

Despite this dangerous history, Clarey had been hired by Washington Transportation, a company operated by the Rangeloff brothers that lacked proper insurance coverage and federal operating authority at the time of the incident. In this case, the broker, Heyl Logistics, was also found liable.

The Chameleon Carrier Pattern

The investigation revealed that Clarey worked for a complex web of related trucking companies operated by twin brothers Eric and Forrest Rangeloff. This operation exemplified the chameleon carrier problem that federal regulators were just beginning to understand. Eric operated Seattle Bulk Shipping in Seattle, Washington, from 2013 to 2022. According to Washington State Corporation records, the business was closed in 2022. However, the dates listed in his social media profiles indicate that the business has been open since 2005 and continues to operate today. Not to worry, over the years, he's operated several failed businesses:

Business Name

• COLD STORAGE EXPRESS, INC.

  • WA PROFIT CORPORATION

  • 3233 16TH AVE SW, SEATTLE, WA, 98134, UNITED STATES

  • ERIC RANGELOFF

  • ADMINISTRATIVELY DISSOLVED

• DCB TRUCKING, LLC

  • WA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

  • 3233 16TH AVE SW, SEATTLE, WA, 98134, UNITED STATES

  • ERIC RANGELOFF

  • INACTIVE

• SEATTLE BULK RAIL STATION, INC.

  • WA PROFIT CORPORATION

  • 337 CLAY ST NW, AUBURN, WA, 98001, UNITED STATES

  • ERIC RANGELOFF

  • ADMINISTRATIVELY DISSOLVED

• SEATTLE BULK SHIPPING INC.

  • FOREIGN PROFIT CORPORATION

  • 3233 16TH AVE SW, SEATTLE, WA, 98134-1023, UNITED STATES

  • ERIC RANGELOFF

  • TERMINATED

• SEATTLE TRANSLOAD,INC.

  • WA PROFIT CORPORATION

  • 3629 DUWAMISH AVE S, SEATTLE, WA, 98134, UNITED STATES

  • ERIC RANGELOFF

  • ADMINISTRATIVELY DISSOLVED

Brandon Rangeloff, Eric’s son, although not involved in this case, was the President of the same Seattle Transload until it “closed”, and he subsequently founded Provisioners Warehouse and Transportation Services. We do not know if Eric continued to work for the new business. Provisoners Warehouse remains active to this day with no ties to Eric.

The chameleon carrier problem extended beyond just business partnerships for the Rangeloff brothers, it became a family affair involving the next generation. While twin brothers Eric and Forrest Rangeloff were operating their web of trucking companies that led to Kelly Linhart's death, Eric faced separate federal criminal charges for stealing a 1983 Rolls-Royce Silver Spirit that had belonged to the Saudi royal family and was customized for a princess. The luxury sedan had sat in a locked Customs warehouse at the Port of Seattle for over 20 years when Eric used a company forklift to move it to his property and attempted to sell it to a collector. When federal prosecutors built their case, they discovered that Eric had "perjured himself and had others lie on his behalf, including his teenage son, Brandon, who "took responsibility for the forklift tracks, although evidence indicated otherwise." The case eluded to how chameleon carrier operators involved family members in their schemes, with Brandon attempting to shield his father from federal conviction by falsely claiming responsibility for evidence that showed the Rolls-Royce had been stolen. Eric ultimately received just 10 days in jail and a $3,000 fine, demonstrating the light penalties that enabled such operators to continue their dangerous practices across multiple business ventures.

Forrest Rangeloff had previously operated trucking companies that received poor safety ratings from the FMCSA. In depositions, he admitted opening Range Transportation because he "could not get a satisfactory rating" from federal regulators. Range Transportation subsequently received a conditional rating.

Even after Linhart's death, the pattern continued. Rangeloff filed to open yet another trucking company called Range-It Express. Federal regulators eventually shut down this third iteration for failing to pay required fines.

The Government Accountability Office later identified this operation as part of a larger pattern, finding that suspected chameleon carriers were involved in severe accidents at three times the rate of compliant carriers, 18 percent versus 6 percent.

According to civil court case records, the Rangeloffs involved here have been involved with over a dozen different rucking companies.

The case became legally significant beyond the chameleon carrier issue because it established precedent for holding freight brokers liable for negligent hiring practices. Heyl Logistics of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, had contracted with Forrest Rangeloff to transport bottled water for Nestlé Waters North America.

Rangeloff then sub-contracted the load to his brother Eric's company, Washington Transportation, which employed Clarey. At the time of the fatal crash, Washington Transportation lacked both insurance coverage and federal operating authority, critical requirements that Heyl Logistics failed to verify.

Linhart's family, represented by attorney Michael Leizerman, filed a comprehensive lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the Rangeloff brothers, their companies, Clarey, Heyl Logistics, and Nestlé Waters North America.

In March 2012, an Oregon federal jury returned a $5.2 million verdict, including $1.68 million in punitive damages against Heyl Logistics for negligent hiring. This marked the first punitive damages verdict against a transportation broker in a negligent hiring case, establishing important precedent for broker liability.

The jury found that Heyl Logistics failed to perform adequate due diligence when hiring Washington Transportation, despite clear warning signs, including the company's lack of proper insurance and operating authority.

Daniel Clarey pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide and driving under the influence. He was sentenced to 40 months in federal prison. The case became a rallying point for families affected by chameleon carrier crashes and for safety advocates pushing for stronger regulatory oversight.

The Linhart case settled out of court for a confidential amount. Forrest Rangeloff was dropped from the lawsuit as part of the settlement agreements. The case record shows extensive legal proceedings through 2012, with multiple defendants and complex liability issues.

Michael Leizerman, the family's attorney, has continued to handle trucking accident cases involving chameleon carriers and has become a leading expert on the issue. He frequently cites the Linhart case as an example of the deadly consequences when carriers avoid regulatory compliance.

The case led directly to enhanced FMCSA vetting procedures and influenced the agency's development of algorithms to identify potential chameleon carriers during the application process.

Legacy

Both cases directly prompted the FMCSA to develop its vetting program, launched in 2016, which uses automated risk-based assessments to screen new carrier applications. The system employs algorithms to identify patterns suggesting chameleon carrier behavior, including shared addresses, phone numbers, and business relationships with previously shut-down carriers.

Since its implementation, the program has screened nearly 90,000 applicants, flagging approximately 8,000 as potential chameleon carriers. While the exact number of rejected applications remains confidential, FMCSA officials describe it as "substantial." So…how do we continue to have these issues?

The Sherman crash specifically led to improved oversight of state-delegated vehicle inspection programs. The FMCSA strengthened requirements for inspection stations and implemented better auditing procedures to prevent the type of inadequate inspection that approved the Sherman bus just days before the fatal crash.

Both cases became cautionary tales within the transportation industry, frequently cited in training programs, legal proceedings, and regulatory discussions. They demonstrated how chameleon carriers threaten not just individual safety but the integrity of the entire commercial vehicle regulatory framework.

The cases also influenced broker liability standards, with the Linhart verdict establishing a precedent that continues to shape how freight brokers conduct due diligence on carrier partners.

Despite technological improvements, the chameleon carrier problem persists. The FMCSA continues to identify hundreds of suspected reincarnated carriers annually. The Government Accountability Office's most recent assessments suggest that while progress has been made, gaps remain in the vetting system.

Modern chameleon carriers have adapted to enhanced oversight by using more sophisticated methods to disguise their identities and relationships. This ongoing arms race between regulators and bad actors continues to challenge enforcement efforts.

Both cases left lasting trauma on the victims' families and communities. The Vietnamese Catholic community in Houston was devastated by the loss of 17 pilgrims, while the Linhart family became advocates for stronger trucking safety regulations.

Yen-Chi Le, whose mother died in the Sherman crash, became a vocal critic of lenient penalties for unsafe operators. The family continues to advocate for more substantial criminal penalties for commercial vehicle safety violations that result in fatalities.

Both the Sherman crash and Kelly Linhart's death represent watershed moments in commercial vehicle safety regulation. They exposed how dangerous operators could game the federal oversight system, leading to comprehensive reforms that continue to evolve today.

While progress has been made in identifying and preventing chameleon carriers, these foundational cases serve as stark reminders of the deadly consequences when regulatory oversight fails. They underscore the importance of continued vigilance, enhanced technology, and vigorous enforcement in protecting public safety on America's highways.

The victims of these tragedies did not die in vain if their cases continue to drive improvements in commercial vehicle safety. Their stories remain central to understanding why chameleon carrier reform represents one of the most important transportation safety initiatives of the past two decades.