The Pruitt Crash: Part Two - Lives Depend How You Manage Your Tech
How collision avoidance systems failed eight children and why the driver who killed them is now back in business
My child, known to many of you as “G,” rides a bus every day from York County, VA, to Williamsburg, VA, which is a dangerous stretch of I-64 West in VA. This crash reminds me of it every single day.
What has amazed me about this Pruitt crash is the lack of coverage from anyone. I first covered it in early 2024, and to my knowledge, no one from traditional media has ever covered this crash. This is part two, where I believe we find the reason why it’s never been covered in great detail. People focused on Hanson and Adkins, but no one addressed the second driver, and no one mentioned the involvement of Samsara.
The most dangerous situation in modern trucking tech is false confidence in technology that doesn’t deliver when lives depend on it. The Pruitt v. Hansen & Adkins case, with Samsara Inc. as a co-defendant, demonstrates why an objective evaluation of technology performance matters more than marketing promises, and why professional drivers and fleet managers should demand accountability from vendors who oversell capabilities while underdelivering on protection.
This case reveals something far more disturbing than technology failure. Three years after killing eight children in a preventable crash, the Ethiopian immigrant driver responsible for their deaths now operates his own trucking company under active federal authority. At the same time, the safety technology that failed them continues to be marketed as collision prevention despite documented performance failures.
On June 19, 2021, near Greenville, Alabama, a truck equipped with Samsara’s CM31 Dash Camera and telematics system struck a Ford Explorer at approximately 51 mph, initiating a chain-reaction crash that culminated in a post-crash fire consuming six vehicles. The NTSB’s detailed video analysis reveals that Samsara’s system, which advertises an “83% reduction in at-fault incidents,” failed to provide adequate warnings despite monitoring the exact hazardous conditions it was designed to detect.
What followed was a second truck driven by Mamuye Ayane Takelu, who slammed into the burning wreckage, pushing the Tallapoosa County Girls Ranch van into the median, where eight children burned to death. Today, Takelu operates E&V LOGIN TRUCKING LLC (USDOT 4233479) from the same Clarkston, Georgia area where he obtained his original commercial license through a system that apparently never verified his English proficiency or driving competency.
This is about an industry-wide crisis where some technology vendors make safety promises that create false confidence. At the same time, regulatory systems allow dangerous operators to kill children and return to business as usual.
Samsara markets its technology as a comprehensive safety solution that detects and alerts drivers and fleet managers to driving hazards “so that wrecks like the one in this case could be avoided.” The company’s promotional materials promise real-time monitoring, instant alerts, and proactive intervention to prevent collisions involving following too closely, exactly the violation that occurred on Interstate 65.
According to the NTSB investigation, the Samsara system was actively monitoring driver James Woodfork’s behavior and road conditions throughout the sequence of the crash. The dashcam recorded the entire incident, telematics systems tracked the vehicle’s speed and location, and the ECU communicator was collecting data on the vehicle’s performance. Despite having all the inputs needed to detect the developing hazard, the system failed to provide timely warnings that could have prevented the tragedy.
The NTSB’s frame-by-frame video analysis shows the system had multiple opportunities to alert the driver to dangerous following distances and rapidly changing traffic conditions. Video timestamps reveal that the truck was initially traveling 72 mph, slowed inadequately as traffic congested ahead, and struck the Ford Explorer while still traveling over 50 mph. Throughout this sequence, Samsara’s collision avoidance technology remained silent.
When NTSB investigators found “discrepancies in Samsara’s footage” and Samsara, after trying every possible loophole to get rid of this case without answering any NTSB inquires, or to face any accoutnability, finally settled the lawsuit to avoid public scrutiny of their system’s performance, it confirmed what families affected by the crash already knew: the technology marketed as collision prevention had failed when it was needed most.
While Hansen & Adkins faced accountability for employing a driver with known violations, the second truck driver who delivered the killing blow faced no criminal charges despite being directly responsible for eight children’s deaths. Mamuye Ayane Takelu, whose Freightliner pushed the girls’ van into the burning median, simply disappeared from public view after the crash.
Our investigation revealed where he went: nowhere.
Georgia Corporations Division records show that in April 2024, just three years after killing eight children, Takelu formed his own trucking company. E&V LOGIN TRUCKING LLC operates under USDOT number 4233479 with Takelu as the registered agent, located at 3834 Brockett Trail, Apt. A, Clarkston, GA 30021. The same regulatory system that failed to prevent him from killing children has now granted him expanded ability to operate his own commercial enterprise.
This represents the ultimate failure of America’s commercial vehicle safety system. Not only did regulators fail to prevent an apparently unqualified driver from obtaining a CDL and killing children, but they rewarded his return to the industry with business ownership opportunities.
Meanwhile, the network that produced Takelu continues operating exactly as before. Alebachew Ademe, the owner of Asmat Express who put Takelu behind the wheel, has operated at least eight different companies since the crash, while avoiding meaningful accountability for his role in the tragedy.
Independent research conducted by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute documented Samsara’s performance in controlled testing environments. The findings reveal fundamental failures in technology marketed as collision prevention:
Critical System Failures in Controlled Testing:
Phone call detection: Failed to alert in 62% of cases when drivers were on phone calls
Texting detection: Missed 70% of dangerous texting behaviors
Close following: Failed to detect 82% of dangerous tailgating situations, the exact behavior that killed eight children in Alabama
Rolling stop violations: Complete failure with 0% detection rate
Seatbelt violations: Failed to trigger any alerts during the entire controlled study period
These aren’t minor performance gaps. When a system fails to detect basic unsafe behaviors that directly cause crashes, it’s not a safety solution, it’s a liability that creates false confidence. My own side-by-side testing of Samsara after I left them as an enterprise client was actually worse.
The controlled testing results explain why Samsara’s system remained silent as Woodfork approached stopped traffic at dangerous speeds. The technology simply doesn’t work as advertised for the scenarios it claims to prevent. This isn’t the only crash its just the most documented crash, several of these I have been directly involved in.
The Pruitt crash represents just one case in a documented pattern of Samsara system failures during fatal crashes:
Andrew Barrett was killed in New Mexico when a distracted Lily Transportation driver struck his vehicle. Despite Samsara’s distraction detection technology being present, the driver’s behavior directly caused a preventable death.
Matthew and Cimberley Hansen died in Minnesota when an Arka Express driver struck their vehicle. Once again, Samsara’s monitoring system was in the vehicle while the driver watched Netflix.
Greg Cox and Lindsay Watson were killed in Arizona, leaving their three children orphaned. Despite being equipped with Samsara’s collision monitoring system, it only detected a “harsh event” after the head-on collision that destroyed their family. The system marketed as collision prevention became merely a crash recorder after failing to prevent anything.
Ashley Chapman, just 24 years old, was killed in Virginia when sleeping driver Richard Hutchinson slammed into her vehicle. Samsara’s fatigue detection system provided no alert to the drowsy driver, no intervention to prevent another senseless death. I was a consultant for this carrier, Lucky Dog, post-crash. One of the worst carriers I have ever worked with. The truck driver is serving a 3-year sentence after his conviction. The trucking company owner? Sold its assets to MBI and is living the good life. The driver was alerted of the impending crash at the time of the collision, giving him no time to wake up and react.
These cases represent a documented pattern of technology that consistently fails to perform its core marketed function of preventing crashes and saving lives when the critical moment arrives.
As someone who was a Samsara enterprise client and later switched to other vendors based on objective performance comparisons, and issues Samsara wouldn’t or couldn’t mitigate, including interlock failures, high-dollar wasted labor needed to administer and monitor an inaccurate system, I’ve seen firsthand how different systems perform under real-world conditions. The decision to switch wasn’t based on vendor relationships or marketing materials, it was based on measurable differences in system reliability, alert accuracy, and actual safety outcomes.
Full disclosure: I first covered this story in Pruitt before I became a private tech consultant or was paid by anyone. Currently, in one of my various roles, I serve as an industry marketing consultant for Motive, but vendor payments have never influenced my technology recommendations, nor did they know I was writing this, nor did they have any hand in the consideration or review of this publication. That’s because I am not here to promote Motive. Before any consulting relationships began in late 2024, I advocated for objectively effective technology solutions based solely on performance data, side-by-side trials, and measurable safety improvements. I still recommend various vendors, including Netradyne, Garmin, and Nexar, among others, when their systems deliver genuine value for specific fleet needs and fleets. I simply do not believe, as a former client, expert witness and claims, fleet compliance and risk guy, that Samsara is a product that belongs in the top three or top tier of fleet tech vendors. As a fleet owner and executive, while I don’t want to see fleets waste money, I certainly don’t want people dying. Preserving life and property is my top priority.
The critical distinction isn’t between having technology versus not having technology, it’s between technology that works as advertised versus technology that creates false confidence. When fleets invest in collision avoidance systems believing they provide protection that those systems can’t actually deliver, it creates risk scenarios where human vigilance decreases while technological backup fails.
Some consultants prioritize the client who pays them the most. I have a list of about 12 fleet tech vendors I support at an objective position because my name is tied to that referral and I don’t refer products that won’t help you manage your business, or reduce risk, exposure and frequency. I will not push products for money alone, I get daily requests to push services or products and I reject 90% of them objectively.
The most troubling aspect of the Samsara case is how the company responds to legitimate performance questions. Rather than addressing documented system failures that contributed to children’s deaths, Samsara’s pattern involves attacking anyone who threatens their marketing narrative. That includes me. This is an email Samsara sent my clients, Gallagher Bassett, and Captie Resources, after I refused to refer Samsara as a partner tech vendor to captive clients.
When I began investigating the Pruitt crash and documenting Samsara’s role in the tragedy, the company’s response was swift and telling. Rather than engage with the substance of system failures that contributed to eight children’s deaths, they attacked me personally for asking uncomfortable questions about their product’s performance during a mass casualty event.
This is the response of a company that values stock price over child safety, marketing narratives over engineering integrity, corporate profits over the families destroyed by their technology failures. When safety technology vendors respond to crash investigations by attacking the investigators rather than examining their systems’ performance, it reveals corporate values that prioritize reputation management over actual safety improvement.
The NTSB and FMCSA investigations into the Pruitt crash demonstrate institutional blindness to the systemic failures that enabled this tragedy. While federal investigators conducted detailed crash reconstruction and analyzed vehicle performance, they completely ignored the core question of how an apparently unqualified driver obtained a commercial license in the first place.
There was no investigation of Takelu’s immigration status, English proficiency, or the Ethiopian trucking network in Clarkston, Georgia that produced him. No examination of the CDL mills that provide licenses without adequate safety training. No accountability for the regulatory failures that allowed Asmat Express to operate with minimal oversight while putting dangerous drivers behind commercial vehicle wheels.
The result is a system that treats symptoms while ignoring the disease. Investigators focused on weather and speed while refusing to examine the institutional failures that put unqualified drivers in position to kill children using ineffective safety technology.
Today, Takelu continues operating in the same community that produced the original tragedy, with federal authorities apparently unaware or unconcerned about the connections between past failures and current operations.
Samsara’s failure in Alabama represents a broader problem with how safety technology is marketed versus how it performs. Companies sell systems based on statistical claims about incident reduction while avoiding specific performance guarantees about when and how their technology will actually function during the scenarios they claim to prevent.
Professional drivers and fleet managers make critical safety decisions based on technology vendors’ promises. When carriers invest in collision avoidance systems, they’re buying confidence that the technology will provide the protection it advertises. When that technology fails during the exact scenarios it’s designed to handle, it undermines trust in legitimate safety technology that actually works.
The controlled testing data proves that effective collision avoidance technology exists. Other systems successfully detect the unsafe behaviors that Samsara’s technology misses, but the market rewards companies that prioritize aggressive marketing over engineering excellence, creating a race to the bottom where families pay the ultimate price.
Three years after eight children died in a preventable crash, every institution involved in the tragedy has escaped meaningful accountability. Samsara settled the lawsuit to avoid public examination of their system’s failures and never responded to questions about their system to the NTSB, as noted in the NTSB report. Federal regulators treated this as an isolated weather-related incident rather than investigating the systemic failures that enabled it. The driver who killed eight children now operates his own trucking company under federal authority.
Meanwhile, families continue investing in safety technology believing it will protect them from exactly the type of tragedy that occurred in Alabama. Fleet managers install collision avoidance systems trusting vendor promises about performance that controlled testing proves are false. Drivers depend on alerts that fail to sound when lives hang in the balance.
This investigation began as an examination of technology failure. It revealed a complete breakdown of accountability that enables dangerous operators to continue threatening public safety.
Professional drivers and responsible carriers support advanced safety technology when it delivers genuine protection. We understand that modern driver populations and traffic conditions require technological assistance to maintain safety standards, but we also understand that false confidence in unreliable technology can be more dangerous than honestly acknowledging system limitations and planning accordingly.
Real reform requires regulatory agencies that investigate the institutional failures enabling dangerous operators rather than avoiding uncomfortable questions about immigration, English proficiency, and CDL integrity. More importantly, it requires an industry culture that prioritizes actual safety outcomes over marketing narratives, where companies face meaningful consequences when their technology failures contribute to preventable deaths.
The eight children who died in Alabama deserved safety technology that worked when they needed it most. They deserved a regulatory system that prevented dangerous drivers from obtaining licenses. They deserved accountability when both systems failed them.
Instead, they got technology that remained silent during their final moments and a system that allowed their killer to return to business ownership three years later. Until we demand better, from technology vendors, from regulators, from the entire commercial vehicle safety ecosystem, more families will pay the ultimate price for institutional failures disguised as tragic accidents.
The children of Tallapoosa County Girls Ranch died because adults failed them at every level. Their memory demands that we do better than the system that enabled their preventable deaths.